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Abstract
This paper investigates whether political connections affect individuals’ propensity
to engage in white-collar crime. We identify connections by campaign donations or di-
rect friendships and use the 2007 French Presidential election as a marker of change in
the value of political connections to the winning candidate. We compare the behavior
of Directors of publicly listed companies who were connected to the future President to
the behavior of other non-connected Directors, before and after the election. Consis-
tent with the belief that connections to a powerful politician can protect someone from
prosecution or punishment, we uncover indirect evidence that connected Directors are
more likely to engage in suspicious insider trading after the election: Purchases by
connected Directors trigger larger abnormal returns, connected Directors are less likely
to comply with trading disclosure requirements in a timely fashion, and connected Di-
rectors trade closer in time to their firms’ announcements of results.
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“Selon que vous serez puissant ou misérable,
Les jugements de cour vous rendront blanc ou noir.”1
Les Animaux malades de la Peste – Jean de La Fontaine, 1678
1 Introduction
Insider trading based on privileged information is a crime in most countries (Bhattacharya
and Daouk 2002).2 The decision to engage in illegal insider trading can be considered a
rational choice based on the trade-off between the expected private costs and benefits (Becker
1968). Among these expected costs, the probability of being investigated or punished can
vary by individual characteristics, such as one’s social networks if these can be used to reduce
exposure to punishment.
In this paper, we study how political connections affect individuals’ propensity to engage
in alleged illegal insider trading. To this end, we use data on Nicolas Sarkozy’s known
friendships with businessmen constructed by Coulomb and Sangnier (2014) and the list of
large contributors to his 2007 electoral campaign leaked by Mediapart.fr, a French news
website. We relate this data to detailed and comprehensive information on the trades by
Directors3 of French listed companies around the time of the 2007 French Presidential election
to see whether Directors connected to Nicolas Sarkozy—the winning candidate—changed
their financial-market behavior in response to his new powers.
Uncovering changes in the behavior of Sarkozy associates in financial markets following
his election is challenging for a number of reasons. First, Sarkozy was a rising star in the
political arena before the election, and the 2007 electoral outcome was partly predicted in
the weeks before the election. In addition, Directors do not trade their company’s shares
very frequently. Together, these facts prevent us from identifying changes in financial be-
havior following the 2007 election using a sharp-discontinuity identification approach. In
addition, connections to Sarkozy are likely correlated with difficult-to-observe but distinc-
tive characteristics that might be associated with particular financial-market behavior. To
circumvent these difficulties, we use two complementary identification strategies to capture
1“Thus human courts acquit the strong, And doom the weak, as therefore wrong.” The Animals Sick of
the Plague – Translation by Wright (1842).
2This regulation is motivated by the expected damages to society of such behavior. Insider trading using
privileged information discourages outsiders from investing in equities (Ausubel 1990), reduces corporate
investment (Manove 1989), and raises the cost of equity (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002). For further
discussion of the costs of insider trading based on privileged information, see Manne (1966), Fishman and
Hagerty (1992), Leland (1992) and Brochet (2019), among others.
3Throughout the paper, we refer to “Director” as any Executive or External Board Member whose trades
need to be reported to the AMF by law.
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the change in Sarkozy associates’ financial activities in the 2-year window around the 2007
French Presidential election. We first take a difference-in-differences approach, where we
compare Sarkozy associates to non-connected Directors who sit on the same Boards as do
the Sarkozy associates. This helps us to uncover significant changes in behavior that pass
a series of robustness checks and falsification exercises. Second, we use a synthetic control
method approach, as pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and used by Angrist and
Kuersteiner (2011), Cavallo et al. (2013), Acemoglu et al. (2016) and Angrist et al. (2018),
among others. We compare the post-treatment outcomes of Sarkozy associates to those of a
non-treated group selected to best match the pre-treatment outcomes of the treated group:
this also reveals a post-election change in behavior that is particular to Sarkozy associates.
We uncover evidence of greater suspicious trading activity by connected Directors after
the election: Directors connected to Sarkozy trade more using privileged information about
their company’s stocks after Sarkozy’s victory relative to non-connected Directors. They
are also less likely to comply with legal trade-reporting requirements, and they trade closer
to their firm’s announcement of results (a period in which significant privileged information
circulates within firms).
France in 2007 provides a particularly appropriate context in which to tackle our research
question, for a number of reasons. First, both the regulatory framework and the de facto
prosecution of insider trading were stable around the time of the 2007 French Presidential
election. This is best illustrated by the stability in the prosecution activity of insider-
trading cases examined by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF)—the national agency
overseeing French financial markets—over the 2006–2008 period. In addition, a European
directive applied in Spring 2006 made it compulsory for all Board Members of publicly listed
French firms to report trades in their company’s shares to the AMF, producing comprehensive
trade-level data that we extracted from the AMF archives. Second, the victory of Nicolas
Sarkozy in the 2007 French Presidential election represented a large positive shock to the
value of pre-election connections to Sarkozy.4 Third, France is particularly well-suited to
investigate Directors’ social ties, as the country’s elites are very concentrated and politically
connected, as documented by Kramarz and Thesmar (2013). Last, one key feature of the
French setting is that companies are not allowed to directly finance political parties. This,
together with the leaked list of large contributors to the Sarkozy campaign, allows us to
4The literature has used different measures of the value of political connections. Elections or political
nominations are used by Knight (2007), Ferguson and Voth (2008), Goldman et al. (2009), Cooper et al.
(2010), Imai and Shelton (2011), Coulomb and Sangnier (2014) and Akey (2015). Other events have also
been considered, such as non-electoral power shifts (Fisman 2001, Jayachandran 2006 and Acemoglu et al.
2018), the appointments of politically connected Directors (Faccio 2006 and Fan et al. 2007) and the local-
government appointments of former employees (Cingano and Pinotti 2013).
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identify the effects of individual- rather than firm-level connections.
We do not rely on the cases detected or prosecuted by the Police or Judiciary, as they may
change their monitoring and prosecution according to the identity of the suspects and their
political ties. In contrast, detailed and a priori comprehensive information about trades
by Directors of French listed companies allow us to construct three dependent variables
capturing different dimensions of their trading behavior that can be related to illegal insider
trading according to the finance literature and the red flags used by market-monitoring
authorities (Autorité des Marchés Financiers, 2009).5 First, we follow the literature and
proxy the information content of trades via the abnormal stock returns following the public
disclosure of insider purchases. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that the abnormal
returns triggered by purchases announced by Sarkozy associates rose by about 1% following
the 2007 Presidential election, which is an economically significant effect.
Insiders trading on private information may have incentives to delay reporting their
trades, as any delay lengthens the period during which privileged information can progres-
sively leak to other market participants. A greater delay in reporting may then dilute the
market’s reaction to insider trades, making them more difficult to detect. This is why in-
siders are obliged to report their trades in a timely manner. In France, the Executives and
Board Members of French publicly listed companies are required to disclose to the AMF any
transactions on stocks of firms in which they hold a managerial position or a Directorship
within five business days. This is the second dimension in which we observe Directors’ be-
havior. Our difference-in-differences estimates suggest that the probability that connected
Directors exceed this reporting time limit rose by about 12% following Nicolas Sarkozy’s
election.
Last, we present evidence that connected Directors traded on average about 1.5 months
closer to the announcements of firm results after the election. Under the assumption that
information (which is not yet available to other market participants) is more likely to be
available to insiders close to results announcements, this further suggests that connected
Directors traded more using firm-sourced privileged information after the election.
The estimates of the change in Sarkozy associates’ trading behavior using a synthetic
control method are consistent with the evidence from the difference-in-differences approach.
The rise in the abnormal returns from purchases by connected Directors is around double
that previously estimated, as is that for the Sarkozy associates’ drop in compliance. The
5Our approach is in line with studies that rely on indirect evidence of fraudulent behaviors. For example,
Baltrunaite (2020) and Andreyanov et al. (2018) interpret observations of firm bidding behavior in public
procurement auctions as evidence of political favoritism or corruption. Byrne and De Roos (2019) and Dong
et al. (2019) relate dynamics in firm gross margins or in retail prices as indirect evidence of outlawed cartel
behaviour in the industrial organization literature.
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estimate for the time between connected Directors’ trades and the firm’s next result release
is unaffected.
Our findings are consistent with the classic model of crime as rational behavior in Becker
(1968), with the expected costs of crime depending on the probability of being caught and
the severity of the punishment if convicted. This line of reasoning, like the popular belief
noted by Jean de La Fontaine in 1678, suggests that Directors may be more likely to engage
in fraudulent behavior if they believe that their connections will help protect them against
prosecution. This protection can be manifested at different non-mutually exclusive levels:
their financial activities may be less monitored by the financial regulatory authorities, they
may run a lower risk of prosecution, and they may face smaller penalties if prosecuted.6
An alternative explanation is that Sarkozy associates’ trades contain more privileged
information than those by other Directors, as the former have greater access to govern-
ment information about future policies.7 We do not believe that this is the main channel
at play for four reasons. First, Sarkozy associates are not the only group that may have
privileged access to government information. If lobbyists, policy-makers, union officials or
journalists also have this information, future reforms should already appear in market prices,
so that the market’s reaction to connected Directors’ trades should be negligible. Second,
were privileged information to be extracted from the government via more efficient lobby-
ing, non-connected Directors sitting on the same Board as a connected Director may also
have access to this information.8 If so, the specific behavior of Sarkozy associates after the
election, uncovered from the within-firm comparison with non-connected Directors, could be
interpreted as Sarkozy associates using more private information in their trades than non-
connected Directors, while the latter also have access to privileged government information.
Third, connected Directors trade closer to the announcement of the firm’s results, in line
with the interpretation that Directors trade on firm- rather than government-sourced infor-
mation. Finally, we provide a more direct test that supports the evidence that a change in
government-sourced information does not alone drive the increase in trading anomalies of
6This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Correia (2014), who shows that US firms’ political
contributions reduce the penalties prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission for both firms
and their executives in cases of prosecution for fraudulent accounting practices. Note that Directors may
also believe that political connections place them under stronger scrutiny due, for instance, to greater media
attention, making them less inclined to act illegally. While we are not able to directly test for the existence
of this alternative mechanism, our empirical results at least suggest that this is not dominant, since this
would produce less, rather than more, suspicious trading activity.
7Akin et al. (forthcoming) and Jagolinzer et al. (forthcoming) provide empirical evidence in favor of this
conjecture during the financial crisis in the US banking industry.
8Similarly, it is unlikely that connected Directors with strategic information from the government would
not share it with their fellow non-connected Board Members, as this could be more profitable overall than
opportunistic trading.
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connected Directors after the election. Analyzing the market reaction to the announcements
of Directors’ purchases, we do not find a post-election change in the abnormal returns of
the same industry stocks as those traded by Sarkozy associates when the latter stocks are
disclosed to the public. This suggests that trades by connected Directors are unlikely to
contain privileged government-sourced and industry-relevant information.
Overall, while we cannot fully disentangle all of the different mechanisms at play, our pre-
ferred interpretation is that the increase in suspicious trades is due to a feeling of impunity
on the part of Sarkozy associates that led them to use more firm-sourced privileged infor-
mation, rather than due to easier access to privileged information about future government
policies. Note, however, that trading based on privileged information is illegal regardless
of the source of the privileged information (government or firm) and the mechanisms, i.e.,
whether Sarkozy associates use more private information because they feel protected and/or
they have access to more private information after the election (and feel safer using it).
Our work here contributes to two distinct strands of the literature. The first is that on
the determinants of individual engagement in illegal activities. Adding to the analysis of the
determinants of crime, we show that political connections seem to encourage white-collar
crime.9,10 We stress the importance of social ties in criminal activities, as in Patacchini and
Zenou (2008), Bayer et al. (2009) and Mastrobuoni (2015). Patacchini and Zenou (2008)
show that even weak ties to criminals increase the probability of becoming a criminal. Bayer
et al. (2009) consider how the social ties amongst offenders constructed during shared juvenile
detention in the US affect future criminal behavior. In Mastrobuoni (2015), the economic
status of Italian Mafia members increases with their centrality in the criminal social network.
Our research differs from this work as we look at the impact of connections to politicians—
not criminals—on the likelihood of engaging in criminal activity. In line with papers that
study crime and misconduct that are rare and/or difficult to uncover, we focus on indirect
signals of criminal activities (e.g., Byrne and De Roos 2019, Dong et al. 2019, Baltrunaite
2020 and Andreyanov et al. 2018). We use three measures of Directors’ actual behavior on
financial markets, which allows us to provide a number of pieces of evidence consistent with
politically connected Directors engaging more in suspicious trading.
Our second contribution is to the growing literature on the value of political connections.
This literature focuses primarily on firms, finding evidence that political connections lead to
9The non-exhaustive list of crime determinants in the literature includes income, employment and socio-
economic disparities (Gould et al. 2002 and Miguel 2005), education (Lochner and Moretti 2004 and Deming
2011), social interactions (Glaeser et al. 1996), the expected punishment (Cornwell and Trumbull 1994), prior
juvenile incarceration (Aizer and Doyle 2015), police activity (Levitt 1997 and Di Tella and Schargrodsky
2004) and migration-policy enforcement (Pinotti 2015).
10Another strength of our work is that our sample is composed of Directors of French listed companies,
who form a relatively homogeneous group in terms of employment, salary, education and social background.
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favorable treatment by politicians in power. Following the seminal work of Fisman (2001), a
number of papers have shown that the equity value of politically connected firms is affected
by political events (see Jayachandran 2006, Knight 2007, Claessens et al. 2008, Ferguson
and Voth 2008, Cooper et al. 2010, Dube et al. 2011, Coulomb and Sangnier 2014 and
Acemoglu et al. 2016, among others).11 This literature has recently started to quantify the
social costs of political connections by examining firms’ behavior. For instance, Fisman
and Wang (2015) show that workplace fatalities in China are higher in politically connected
firms; similarly, in Schoenherr (2019), the public-procurement contracts granted to politically
connected South Korean firms are of lower execution quality and have more frequent cost
increases after renegotiation. We depart from this literature by looking at the impact of
political connections on individual behavior in order to uncover the private value of personal
connections to a politician that are gained at the expense of society. Our approach is common
to a small number of recent contributions, such as Cruz et al. (2020), who document that
incumbent municipal politicians give favorable treatment to households that are central in the
social network and can thus provide larger electoral support. Another set of studies estimate
the value of political personal connections by documenting that politicians’ relatives have
better labor-market outcomes in the public sector both in Sweden (Folke et al. 2017) and the
Philippines (Fafchamps and Labonne 2017) and the private sector in Italy (Gagliarducci and
Manacorda 2020). Our results differ from these studies as we focus on individuals outside of
the politicians’ family who engage in illegal behavior that is costly to society.12
As our difference-in-differences analysis is carried out within firms, our evidence refers
to individual- rather than firm-level connections. Overall, we find evidence that politically
connected Directors are more likely to engage in fraudulent behavior after the election of
Nicolas Sarkozy. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that this behavior is profitable,
as the latent stock-market gains of Sarkozy associates rose by roughly 886, 000AC per person
11The literature has shed some light on the channels through which these connections affect firm value.
For instance, politically connected firms can receive preferential treatment from public institutions (Gordon
and Hafer 2005, Correia 2014 and Tahoun and van Lent 2018), obtain more or more profitable government
contracts (Goldman et al. 2013, Boas et al. 2014, and Baltrunaite 2020) and enjoy preferential access to
finance and bank loans (Khwaja and Mian 2005).
12Folke et al. (2017) find no evidence of illegitimate favors and instead interpret their results as evidence
that children of politicians who were already living in a municipality prefer to stay there and work and delay
joining a university. Fafchamps and Labonne (2017) examine elections in the Philippines and show that a
politician’s relatives are more likely to obtain discretionary managerial positions in the local public sector.
The setting does not allow them to distinguish between pure political gains and a hiring decision motivated
by the goal to better execute and deliver on the candidates’ political promises. Finally, Gagliarducci and
Manacorda (2020) document that relatives of politicians are more likely to enjoy labor-market benefits
(employment and income) in the local private sector. They interpret their results as evidence of corruption
since the effect is stronger for sectors that depend more on the public administration and in places with
stronger judicial anti-corruption campaigns.
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following the 2007 Presidential election. This is a significant amount in the French context,
even for top-level Executives, as the average fixed CEO salary in the 40 largest French listed
firms was 985, 000AC in 2007 (Teulon 2013).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
and political context. Section 3 lays out the data and our estimation strategies. The empir-
ical results are presented and challenged in Section 4. Last, Section 5 contains concluding
remarks.
2 Institutional context
This section introduces the French regulatory setting pertaining to insider trading and de-
scribes the context of the 2007 Presidential election.
2.1 Insider-trading regulation
The Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) ensures investors’ protection and guarantees
the proper functioning of financial markets. Its court—the enforcement committee—decides
on penalties.
Like most developed countries, France has laws restricting trading using private informa-
tion. The first law was passed in 1970: Article L.465-1 of the Code monétaire et financier
prohibits insiders from carrying out or facilitating transactions before the public is informed
of any privileged information. The 2005 version of the code lists a maximum penalty of two
years imprisonment and a fine of 1.5 millionAC, which can rise to up to ten times the amount
of the alleged illegal profit. Importantly, the code’s provisions on insider trading remained
unchanged over the 2006–2008 period.
Insider-trade reporting requirements under French law come from the 2003 European
Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC). This directive aims to harmonize disclosure require-
ments within the European Union by mandating the public disclosure of insider transactions
within five business days. Since April 2006, the Directors of French listed firms have been
required by Article L.621-18-2 of the Code monétaire et financier and AMF general regu-
lations to disclose their trades directly to the AMF.13 This information is then posted on
the AMF’s website. Before this date, trades were not systematically disclosed and thus
13This reporting requirement also applies to corporate entities controlled directly or indirectly by the
insider, as well as direct family members (e.g., partners and children) when they are trading shares of the
insider’s company. In practice, family members remain unnamed, and the report provides only the identity
of the Director with whom they are associated.
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were not immediately observed by market participants. Directors who fail to disclose their
transactions within the time limit incur financial penalties.
Market monitoring is carried out by the AMF Market-Surveillance Department for all
financial instruments traded on the French stock exchange. This relies on a number of
automated tests to identify “atypical movements in trading volumes, intermediaries’ market
shares, prices and other situations,” as stated in the AMF 2009 Annual Report. These alerts
cover all sorts of anomalies, not only those related to potential illegal insider trading. Alerts
launched by the AMF internal monitoring system are complemented by other sources such as
suspicious-transaction reports from intermediaries. If suspicion remains after the first check
by AMF analysts, the AMF will start an investigation that leads to a report. The AMF
enforcement committee can then decide to dismiss the case, to impose penalties, and/or to
refer the case to the Judicial Authorities.14
While trading on private information is illegal in France, not all opportunistic trades end
up being prosecuted due to enforcement frictions.15 Online Appendix Table B1 summarizes
all of the publicly available information on AMF monitoring activity and the number of
reported punishments related to insider trading over the 2005–2009 period. Only a few
AMF investigations produce punishment for illegal insider trading around our sample period,
likely due to the burden of proof of demonstrating the use of private material information.
More generally, the figures presented in Online Appendix Table B1 suggest that there was no
change in the AMF’s overall investigation effort, as measured by the number of investigations
or procedures opened, around the 2007 French Presidential election. Online Appendix B
contains further discussion of AMF monitoring and prosecution activities.
2.2 Political context
The French President is elected for a five-year term by direct universal suffrage. In the
2007 election, Nicolas Sarkozy was chosen as the official candidate of the largest Right-Wing
party—the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP). His main competitor was Ségolène
Royal, the official candidate of the largest Left-Wing party—the Parti Socialiste. The first
round of the 2007 French Presidential election was held on April 22nd. As no candidate
received a majority of votes in this first round, a second round between the two candidates
with the greatest number of first-round votes was held on May 6th. Nicolas Sarkozy won
this second round with 53.06% of the votes.
14The cases investigated or prosecuted by the AMF were anonymized over the period of interest, as were
the punishments.
15Opportunistic trades also take place in the United States (Cohen et al. 2012), even though the US has
the most stringent insider trading regulation and enforcement, dating back to as early as 1903 (Bhattacharya
and Daouk 2002).
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Sarkozy had been a member of the successive governments during the previous Presi-
dential term.16 However, his election as President had a significant impact on his power,
which consequently increased the value of a connection to him, for at least two reasons.
First, France is a semi-Presidential Republic where the President has extensive power, and
Nicolas Sarkozy was known to have a strong vision of the President’s role (Jan 2011). In
France, the Prime Minister is chosen by the President and appoints the government, the
composition of which has to be validated by the President. The Parliament votes on laws
that are de facto backed by the President. Over the past two terms, Presidential elections
have immediately preceded parliamentary elections, with the party of the elected President
systematically obtaining the parliamentary majority. The French National Assembly can be
dissolved by the President at any time.
Enforcement of securities regulation can also be affected by the President, who can in-
fluence the two institutions in charge of insider-trading prosecution—the AMF and public
prosecutors. The President appoints the Director of the AMF for a 5-year term. In addition,
public prosecutors are not exempt from the influence of the Executive, as they are under the
authority and control of the Minister of Justice, who is appointed by the President and the
Prime Minister. Public prosecutors’ lack of independence has been explicitly acknowledged
by the European Court of Human Rights.17 See Online Appendix C for additional infor-
mation on how political power can influence insider-trading monitoring and prosecution in
France.
Second, there was a well-documented animosity between Nicolas Sarkozy and both former
President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (see Online Appendix
D for more details). This animosity seriously limited Nicolas Sarkozy’s influence prior to his
election. His 2007 victory was then accompanied by a real increase in his power.
3 Data and estimation strategy
This section first describes the data used in this paper. We then present the different
dependent variables employed to uncover evidence of suspicious trading, and sketch out the
estimation strategies.
16During President Jacques Chirac’s second term (2002–2007), Nicolas Sarkozy served as Minister of the
Interior in Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s first government from May 2002 to March 2004. He was then appointed
Minister of Finance in Raffarin’s second government from March 2004 to May 2005. He was again appointed
Minister of the Interior in Dominique de Villepin’s government from June 2005 to March 2007. Nicolas
Sarkozy left this position to run in the 2007 Presidential election. He was also the leader of the UMP party
from November 2004.
17The European Court of Human Rights’ judgement of the Medvedyev and Others v. France case states
that in France, “the public prosecutor is not a ‘competent legal authority’ within the meaning the Court’s
case-law gives to that notion [...] as he lacks the independence in respect of the executive to qualify as such.”
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3.1 Defining political connections
We consider two types of pre-election connections between Nicolas Sarkozy and the Directors
of French listed firms: major individual campaign contributions and friendship ties.18
French law has prevented firms from contributing to political parties since 1995, and
private contributions are not publicly disclosed. However, in September 2012 the French
news website Mediapart.fr published a column in which journalists reported the existence
of a leaked list of major contributors (“grands donateurs”) to Sarkozy’s 2007 Presidential
campaign. This list was produced by the party’s administration and contains the first and
last names of 565 individuals who had contributed to the UMP and one of its related micro-
parties.19 The existence of the list has never been contested or denied, even by the UMP, and
its accuracy has been publicly confirmed by some of the individuals who appear on it. As
highlighted by Arfi et al. (2012), many individuals working in finance were in this group of
major contributors, which was actually a club—called the Premier Cercle—whose members
gathered at meetings and dinners organized for that purpose (Cori 2010 and Mauduit 2010).
This suggests that the composition of the group was common knowledge among its members,
and that the identities of the UMP’s major individual contributors were known by stock-
market participants around the time of the 2007 French Presidential election.20
During the 2007 electoral campaign, French media reported a number of friendship con-
nections between Nicolas Sarkozy and prominent businessmen. We selected the 27 business-
men who were identified as friends of Sarkozy by Coulomb and Sangnier (2014), using infor-
mation from books written by journalists and political pundits (Chemin and Perrignon 2007
and Dély and Hassoux 2008).
No such connections are known for Ségolène Royal, the main Left-Wing candidate in the
2007 French Presidential election. The media did not report friendship connections between
the Socialist candidate and businessmen, the only exception being that with Pierre Bergé, a
millionaire businessman who was a public supporter of the Parti Socialiste. Similarly, no sign
has ever emerged of any structured group of contributors to her campaign. According to the
18Ferguson and Voth (2008) use Directors’ campaign contributions to identify politically connected firms.
Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Coulomb and Sangnier (2014) use Friendships between politicians and
Directors or shareholders to link firms to politicians.
19According to information in the media, the UMP administration acknowledged that individuals who
appear on the list of major contributors gave at least 3, 000AC to the party during the 2007 campaign. In
France, the maximum allowed individual donation to a political party was 7, 500AC in 2007. However, it
is well known that numerous micro-parties are used as donation recipients to bypass this constraint. The
actual amounts donated by individuals on the list are not known.
20Arfi et al. (2012) reveal suspicions of complaisance concerning tax fraud by campaign contributors. The
activities of some members of this list also attracted the attention of the judicial authorities. For instance,
a member of this group who works as a bank CEO gained private benefits from complex offshore loopholes,
according to Livolsi and Israel (2014).
11
official donation figures provided by the Commission nationale des comptes de campagne
et des financements politiques, Royal received 743, 432AC, as compared to 9, 125, 105AC for
her opponent. Thus, although we cannot formally rule out that some individuals may have
funded both parties, this appears to be unlikely given the modest campaign fund-raising
of the Socialist Party and its stand in the media against the main UMP contributors. In
addition, contributors to Sarkozy’s campaign presumably shared the party’s ideology when
joining the group, which functioned as a club. See Online Appendix E for more details.
3.2 Data on insider transactions
Since the 2006 application of the European directive, all Board Members of French listed
firms must report their trades in their company’s shares to the AMF. These trades are
available from the AMF website as forms stored in an archive or accessible via the website’s
search engine. We collected all forms that relate to insider trades made from May 2006 to
mid-2013 and designed a program to extract information from the documents. See Online
Appendix F for a brief presentation of the AMF data collection and information extraction.
Each trade is uniquely identified by the name of the insider, the name and stock identifier
of the company whose stocks were traded and the transaction date. The forms also indicate
the position of the insider (e.g., Executive or non-Executive Director), the type of transaction
(sale or purchase), the price at which the trade was operated and the total traded value, as
well as the date at which the trade was disclosed to the AMF and the announcement date
(the date at which the AMF made the trade public to market participants). The dataset is
presumably comprehensive.21 It contains 10, 914 trades conducted from mid-2006 to mid-
2008—the time-window we use in the empirical analysis. These trades are associated with
1, 827 distinct Directors.
3.3 Observation of Directors’ behavior
In this paper, we attempt to estimate the impact of political connections on white-collar
crime, here illegal trading by insiders of publicly listed corporations. Since the underlying
mechanism reflects both a lower probability of detection and/or lighter punishment if pros-
ecuted, we cannot rely on prosecution data that would be tainted by any leniency bias of
21There is ultimately no way to prove that all insider trades are reported. However, we believe that
non-reporting is negligible for three reasons. First, we found no evidence of unreported trades in prosecution
cases, or in the media. Second, the brokers who would have carried out these trades would be legally exposed.
Finally, any exercise of stock options has to be reported in firms’ annual reports, which helps to reconcile
operated trades with those reported. All in all, it seems reasonable to conclude that all insider trades are
reported.
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the judicial system towards the politically connected. We instead use observable indirect
measures that plausibly capture changes in the likelihood of breaking the law.
We consider three dependent variables to capture different dimensions of Directors’ be-
havior and uncover evidence of illegal insider trading. These are consistent with the insider-
trading literature and the alert indicators used by enforcement authorities (see sub-Section
2.1 and Online Appendix B). We first look at abnormal stock returns triggered by the an-
nouncement of insider trades to proxy for the private information content of these trades. We
then examine whether Directors comply with the AMF insider-trading reporting regulations.
Last, we use the time from a trade to the firm’s next corporate results announcement as an
indicator of Directors’ opportunistic timing of their trade to potentially benefit from impor-
tant non-public information within the firm prior to the result announcement. While the
first variable relates to the market perception, the other two capture the observed financial
activity of Directors.22
The two-day compound abnormal return on purchases at the announcement date
An extensive body of literature has used the abnormal returns from insider-trade announce-
ments to measure the trades’ information content (see Meulbroek 1992, Lakonishok and
Lee 2001, Fidrmuc et al. 2006 and Fidrmuc et al. 2013, among others). The intuition is
that if market participants believe that insider trades reflect privileged information about
the firm’s future cash flows, outsiders will mimic the insider’s trades, leading to abnormal
returns when the insiders’ trades are made public.23 On the contrary, if insiders trade for
reasons other than profiting from their information (e.g., because of liquidity constraints or
for diversification purposes), theses trades should not trigger abnormal returns.
One conclusion from these contributions (see in particular Lakonishok and Lee 2001,
Jeng et al. 2003) has been that insider sales have a much lower information content than
their purchases.24 We follow the literature and use the abnormal returns triggered by the
22The decision to trade obviously relates to information that is available to an insider and will be disclosed
in the future. Directors are themselves part of the information-disclosure decision, as well as part of the
information-production process, as members of the firm’s Board. In addition, the decision to report a trade
in a timely fashion reflects the aforementioned strategic incentives. As a result, the three variables are
obviously related via strategic decisions. The investigation of the precise form of this nexus of interactions
is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
23This echoes the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis (Malkiel and Fama 1970), in which all public infor-
mation is incorporated into prices. Following this approach, an insider-trade announcement is a new piece
of information relevant to the market valuation of a firm only if the trade uses private information.
24The main mechanism behind this result is that insider sales are driven mostly by diversification and
liquidity motives, as Directors’ portfolios are over-exposed to the stock of their company due to to compen-
sation schemes. As a result, uninformed traders may conjecture that an observed sale is less likely to rely
on private information than a purchase. In other words, the private-information signal from a sale is noisier
than that from a purchase. Observers then extract less information from sales than from purchases.
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announcement of insider purchases to proxy for their informational content.
We obtain daily stock and market returns from Thomson Reuters Datastream and follow
MacKinlay (1997) in constructing firms’ abnormal returns on purchases at the announcement
date. For each purchase, we first estimate the relationship between a firm’s return and that
of the market over a period of 30 days before the announcement date. We then predict the
firm’s returns from those observed on the announcement day and over the next two days
using the estimated market model.25 A similar approach is used by various contributions in
the literature, including Jayachandran (2006), Knight (2007), Coulomb and Sangnier (2014)
and Acemoglu et al. (2016).
The returns to trade will be insignificant on average if insiders trade for reasons that
are unrelated to their private information.26 If we can therefore isolate the specific fac-
tors/situations (such as political connections) that make insider returns, on average, statis-
tically different from zero, this would suggest that insiders traded using private information,
which is illegal. Online Appendix B further discusses the difference between our statistical
approach and that of the Judicial entities that assess opportunistic trades.
Compliance with the legal time limit for reporting trades
As discussed in Section 2, Directors have to directly disclose their trades in their company’s
stocks to the AMF within five business days. Directors who fail to disclose their transactions
within this time limit incur financial penalties. We construct a Compliance with legal time
25We run the following regression for each stock i for which a purchase is announced on day t:
Riτ = αit + βit × R̄τ + εiτ , with τ ∈ [t − 30, t − 1] ,
where Riτ is firm i’s stock return on day τ , R̄τ is the market return on day τ , and εiτ is an error term.
We use the SBF 120 as the market return. The SBF 120 is a reference index composed of the 120 most
actively traded stocks on the Paris Stock Exchange. We estimate the above expression separately for each
firm and each announcement date, which yields trade-level estimated parameters α̂it and β̂it. These are used
to calculate the abnormal returns of each purchase over the two following business days using the following
formula:
R̃iτ = Riτ −
{
α̂it + β̂it × R̄τ
}
, for τ ∈ [t, t + 1, t + 2] ,
where R̃iτ is the abnormal return of stock i on day τ . As highlighted by Jayachandran (2006), the use of
abnormal returns rather than standard market returns addresses the concern that the share prices of some
firms may covary. If covariance pertains due to covariance between these firms and the market, firms will
have the same estimated beta, and the abnormal returns will be independent. Finally, we last calculate the
two-day compound abnormal return on purchases as:
R̃
com
it =
(
1 + R̃i,t
)
×
(
1 + R̃i,t+1
)
×
(
1 + R̃i,t+2
)
− 1.
26By construction, abnormal returns at random dates are on average equal to zero, as they represent the
error terms from our return-estimation models.
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limit dummy if the trade is disclosed to the AMF within five business days. Past research
has shown that insiders attempt to hide the private information embedded in their trades
by delaying trade disclosure (Fidrmuc et al. 2006 and Brochet 2010). Insiders might prefer
to delay their trade reporting to attenuate the market reaction when the trade is disclosed
to market participants, as the market’s reaction usually constitutes the initial red flag iden-
tifying potentially illegal trades. As this strategy is known to the AMF, a delay in disclosure
can also be a red flag. The overall insider strategy depends on beliefs regarding the signals
used by the AMF to detect insider trading and the effect of trade reporting on the market’s
reaction to the public trade announcement.
Time to the firm’s next results announcement
Privileged information is likely to be held by insiders in the period immediately before corpo-
rate results releases. A large body of evidence has shown that informed insider trading occurs
around corporate announcements (see Keown and Pinkerton 1981, Hirschey and Zaima 1989
and John and Lang 1991, among others). We crawled TradingSat.com—an information web-
site about French financial markets—to collect the dates of public announcements by French
listed firms and calculated the Time to firm’s next results announcement for each trade as
the time (in days) between the insider transaction date and the next public results announce-
ment by the firm. While it is not possible a priori to know when insiders become aware of
relevant information, it is reasonable to assume that awareness rises at least weakly as firm
announcements draw closer. Thus, given that trading is the Director’s decision, trades closer
to a results announcement are more likely to reflect private information than those that are
more distant. Consistent with this interpretation, we estimate that the abnormal returns
following the announcements of insider purchases are on average 30% higher for trades one
month closer to the firm’s next results announcement (p-value= 0.013).
3.4 Estimation strategies
Given that the result of the 2007 French Presidential election was anticipated in the weeks
preceding the vote (see Online Appendix D and Coulomb and Sangnier 2014), and that
Directors do not trade their companies’ shares every day, it is not possible to carry out a
sharp discontinuity-style analysis. We therefore use a two-year time-window around the 2007
French Presidential election to capture changes in Directors’ behavior linked to the victory
of Nicolas Sarkozy. Trades are allocated to the pre- or post-election periods according to the
transaction date.
We match data on insider trades to the list of connected businessmen to identify indi-
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viduals who appear in both datasets. Of the 565 campaign contributors, 33 are Directors
who traded stocks in the 2-year time-window around the 2007 French Presidential election;
so are 18 out of the 27 businessmen friends of Nicolas Sarkozy. Only two Directors qualify
as both friends of Nicolas Sarkozy and campaign contributors. We consider all of these 49
individuals as Sarkozy associates.
The group of Sarkozy associates represents 2.7% of the traders operating during our time-
window. They differ from other Directors in a number of ways. First, Sarkozy associates
are Board Members of larger firms, as shown by the plots in Figure 1(a) of the distributions
of firm market capitalization in 2007.27 Second, connected Directors are more likely to hold
Executive positions than are other Directors, as illustrated in Figure 1(b). Sarkozy associates
also differ from other Directors in their trading activity: they trade more frequently and trade
larger amounts, as shown in Figures 1(c) and (d).
We apply two estimation strategies to circumvent, as far as possible, the above issues
relating to the differences in levels between Sarkozy associates and other Directors.
Difference-in-differences. We first select the 65 firms with Sarkozy associates and
use the 336 non-connected Directors in these firms as the comparison group.28 We use this
Associates’ firms sample to estimate the following equation:
yift = βSarkozy associatei × Post-electiont
+ γSarkozy associatei + δPost-electiont
+νf + Xift(1 + Post-electiont) + α + εift,
(1)
where yift is one of the three outcomes described above related to the trade on firm f stock
by Director i on day t, Sarkozy associatei is a dummy for Sarkozy associates, Post-electiont
is a dummy for being after May 6th 2007, εift is the error term, α is a constant, νf is a set
of firm fixed effects, and Xift is a vector of trade/trader characteristics that include the (log
of the) trade value and a dummy for Directors who were members of the firm’s Management
Board at the time of the trade.29 Our coefficient of interest, β, is the difference-in-differences
27This difference in firm size obviously affects our ability to calculate the abnormal returns from trades
using Thomson Reuters Datastream data and retrieve the firm’s event agenda from TradingSat.com. As
illustrated in Online Appendix Figure A1(a), abnormal returns can be calculated for all but 1.54% of trades
in associates’ firms’ stocks, whereas this figure is 11.24% for other firms. Firms’ event data is less available,
with data missing for 15.38% and 19.33% of associates’ and other firms, respectively. Conditional on data
availability, Figure A1(b) in the Online Appendix plots the distribution of firms’ results announcements over
time from January 2006 to December 2008 for each group of firms. The overall distribution of firms’ results
announcements looks similar across both groups of firms. Announcements are relatively more frequent in
March and September.
28The full sample is likely to provide a worse control group than the associates’ firms sample, due to the
aforementioned differences between Sarkozy associates and other Directors. Evidence using the full sample
is presented in Bourveau et al. (2016).
29A trade’s value is included to formally isolate changes in Sarkozy associates’ behavior (or in the market
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estimate of the change in behavior of Sarkozy associates relative to that of non-connected
Directors after the Presidential election. The coefficient γ picks up any within-firm differences
between the behavior of Sarkozy associates and other Directors over the entire period, while δ
captures any common change in the behavior of all Directors post- versus pre-election. The
introduction of firm fixed effects washes out any differences between connected and non-
connected Directors that may be correlated with firm characteristics, such as firms’ internal
regulations. Given the structure of the data, we cluster standard errors by Director, firm and
date. We also consider alternative specifications: First, we add firm fixed effects interacted
with the post-election dummy to the baseline; then, we add linear trends that are specific to
the group of Sarkozy associates and the other Directors; furthermore, we also include trader
fixed effects and repeat the specification changes we just described.
Synthetic control method. Our second estimation strategy is inspired by the synthetic
control method used in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011),
Abadie et al. (2010, 2015), Cavallo et al. (2013), Acemoglu et al. (2016), Gobillon and Magnac
(2016) and Angrist et al. (2018), among others.30 The synthetic control method compares
the post-treatment outcome of the treated group to that of a non-treated group that is
selected to best match the pre-treatment outcome of the treated group. We are therefore
constrained to using only Directors who traded both before and after the 2007 election.
This restriction leaves us with 26 Sarkozy associates and 521 non-connected Directors who
constitute the donor pool. We implement our pseudo-synthetic control method approach as
follows. We first calculate, for each of the three variables of interest, the average outcomes
among Sarkozy associates over the four 3-month periods prior to May 2007. We then select
a potential control group by randomly drawing Directors from the donor pool and allowing
each selected Director to be duplicated up to 10 times. We next calculate each candidate
control group’s fit as the root square error over the pre-treatment sub-periods:
ωj =
√
√
√
√
4
∑
T =0
(ỹj,T − ȳT )
2, (2)
reaction to their trades) that cannot be explained by variations in the traded amounts or any institutional
feature that could link the trade volume to these changes. Note that a trade’s value could constitute a ‘bad
control’ as the election may impact the amounts traded by Sarkozy associates. However, evidence reported
below in Table 1 shows that this is not the case. In addition, excluding this control from the regression does
not alter baseline estimates (see Online Appendix Table G1).
30Our empirical setting has two limitations regarding this approach. (i) Directors do not trade their
company stocks at any regular frequency, which prevents us from observing their behavior at a pre-defined
frequency and constructing consistent individual weights. (ii) The data do not start until mid-2006 when
the reporting of trades became mandatory for Directors of listed firms, which reduces the period in which
we can match the outcomes of connected and non-connected Directors. We nevertheless adapt the main
features of the synthetic control method to our data.
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where ỹj,T and ȳT are the average outcome values over sub-period T in candidate control
group j and the Sarkozy associates, respectively. We iterate 5, 000 times over the donor
pool and keep the comparison group with the lowest ω. Finally, we move to the post-
election period and apply the retained duplication weights to the selected non-connected
Directors. Our pseudo-synthetic control estimate is then calculated as the difference-in-
differences change in the behavior of Sarkozy associates with respect to that group. We
follow Acemoglu et al. (2016) and calculate the p-values of the estimates by replicating the
approach described above for 1, 000 placebo groups of associates randomly drawn from the
set of non-connected Directors, allowing for up to 25% differences in the size of the group
with respect to the original group of Sarkozy associates.
Structure of Sarkozy associates’ trades. The two estimation strategies presented
above are designed to uncover changes in the behavior of Sarkozy associates. One potential
caveat regarding the interpretation of the estimates is that part of the effect could be driven
by changes in the structure of associates’ trades. We test this by estimating difference-in-
differences models that take a Director over each of the two 1-year periods around the 2007
election as the unit of observation. Table 1 shows the estimates of interest using the full
sample and the associates’ firms sample. We start by investigating the extensive margin
of Directors’ trading behavior by constructing a dummy for a Director trading during the
period, for each of the pre- and post-election periods. The difference-in-differences estimates
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 reveal that Sarkozy associates did not change their trading
behavior along the extensive margin.31 We further test for changes in Directors’ trading
in columns 3–12 of Table 1 via alternative dependent variables. We consider Directors’
extensive trading margins (the number or trades, in levels and logs), trade composition (the
number of sales over the total number of trades) and trade values (the log of the total and
average amounts traded). We find no statistically significant difference-in-differences changes
in any of these dimensions. The empirical evidence overall suggests that the cross-section
differences in trading structure between Sarkozy associates and other traders, as shown in
Figures 1(c) and (d), are not associated with any particular changes over time in the trading
patterns of the different groups.
31We also used Board composition data from Mint-Global (Bureau Van Dijk) and BoardEx to check that
the number of Sarkozy associates (traders and non-traders) who sit on a Board was stable before and after
the election. 116 distinct Sarkozy associates sat on a Board before the election (322 positions) and 122 after
the election (334 positions). There are more positions held by associates than there are associates, as they
can sit on the Boards of different companies or occupy multiple positions within the same firm.
18
4 Results
This section presents empirical evidence that Sarkozy associates altered their behavior in
financial markets after the 2007 French Presidential election, suggesting an increase in illegal
insider trading. We first present difference-in-differences estimates and undertake a series of
robustness tests and falsification exercises. We then present the synthetic control estimates.
4.1 Baseline difference-in-differences estimates
We start our analysis by estimating equation (1) using the associates’ firms sample for each
of the three outcomes of interest. Columns 1, 3 and 5 of the top panel of Table 2 show
raw estimates obtained when we use only the minimum difference-in-differences explanatory
variables of interest of equation (1). Columns 2, 4 and 6 of the same panel list the esti-
mated coefficients including firm fixed effects and covariates in equation (1). The estimated
coefficients on the covariates appear in Online Appendix Table A1.
As shown in columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on Sarkozy associate × Post-election is
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels when we use abnormal returns
following the announcement of purchases as the dependent variable: After the election, more
private information was embedded in Sarkozy associates’ purchases than in other Directors’
trades. This effect is also economically significant. The size of the difference-in-differences
estimate is comparable to that of Brochet (2010), who examines the change in insider trade
information content following the adoption of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which imposed
more timely disclosure by US listed firms’ insider traders. Columns 3 and 4 of the top panel
of Table 2 present the difference-in-differences estimates using trader compliance with AMF
legal disclosure requirements as the dependent variable. The estimate of interest is negative
and statistically different from zero: Sarkozy associates became more likely (between 12 and
20 percent) to break the law after Nicolas Sarkozy’s victory, relative to other Directors who
sat on the same Board. Last, columns 5 and 6 of the top panel use the time from the trade to
the firm’s next results announcement as the dependent variable. The coefficient on Sarkozy
associate × Post-election is negative and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level
when we include firm fixed effects and covariates. Sarkozy associates trade about 1.5 months
closer to their firm’s results announcements: In other words, connected Directors trade closer
to sensitive periods. As the underlying reason for banning insider trading before a results
release is that insiders could hold private information during this period, this estimate is
consistent with previous evidence suggesting that connected Directors’ trades contain more
(firm-sourced) private information after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy.
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We then implement two specification changes. We first supplement the baseline specifi-
cation by allowing the firm fixed effects to interact with the post-election dummy variable
(columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 2’s bottom panel). This further restricts the estimation of the
coefficients of interest to the comparison of Directors within each firm and period. While
this mechanically reduces the space for identification, this demanding specification does not
much affect the estimates of interest, although the difference-in-differences coefficients for
the compliance variable and for the time from a trade to the firm’s next results announce-
ment are cut in half (the estimate of the latter variable is less precise but remains close to
conventional statistical significance levels). Second, we include group-specific time trends in
the estimations to flexibly account for the possibility of different time patterns across groups
(columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 2’s bottom panel). Including the trends increases the size of
two of the reported estimates. The introduction of these flexible trends affects the statistical
significance of the estimates, but they continue to have p-values below 0.15.
We consider the dynamics of Sarkozy associates’ change in behavior around the election by
dividing each of the pre- and post-election periods into four 3-month periods. We investigate
the dynamics of this change by introducing an interaction between the Sarkozy associate
variable and dummies for each sub-period, taking May–July 2006 as the reference period,
together with covariates and firm fixed effects as in the even-numbered columns of Table 2’s
top panel. The black-filled circles in Figures 2(a)–(c) plot the estimates of interest. These
figures do not exhibit visual evidence of the existence of pre-trends.32
4.2 Main difference-in-differences robustness and falsification tests
This sub-section presents a series of robustness tests and falsification exercises applied to the
above findings. Online Appendix G presents additional robustness checks.
Construction of the dependent variables
We start by showing that the main results displayed in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 2’s
top panel (specification with firm fixed effects and covariates) are not sensitive to the con-
struction of the dependent variables. The top panel of Table 3 shows the estimates of the
interaction term in equation (1) using alternative dependent variables. We first change the
calibration length of the market model used to calculate abnormal returns following pur-
chase announcements. While the baseline estimation used a 30-day calibration window, the
32The hollow circles in Figures 2(a)–(c) show the estimated coefficients on the difference between Sarkozy
associates’ behavior and that of non-connected Directors in each of the eight sub-periods. These plots echo
the estimates presented in the odd-numbered columns of Table 2’s top panel by highlighting the differences
in levels between the pre- and post-election periods.
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estimate of interest remains similar with 7-, 14-, 60-, 120- and 240-day windows. We then
use the CAC4033 index instead of the SBF120 index for the market return, and we vary the
period over which we calculate compound abnormal returns from one to five days, instead
of two days. These changes do not affect our estimate of the change in Sarkozy associates’
behavior after the election. We next replace the dummy dependent variable of compliance
with legal reporting requirements by the continuous number of business days from the trans-
action to the date at which it is reported. In both levels and logarithms, these alternative
variables confirm that Sarkozy associates were slower to report their trades post election.
Finally, we consider the log of the number of days from a trade to the firm’s next results
announcement and a dummy for the trade taking place less than two months from the next
announcement. These dependent variables continue to show that connected Directors trade
closer to firm result announcements in the post-election period.
Placebo dependent variables
The bottom panel of Table 3 lists the difference-in-differences estimates from placebo depen-
dent variables (variables that should a priori not exhibit any change in behavior). We first
provide a direct test that the change in connected Directors’ behavior is not driven by an
increase in privileged information from the government. We estimate equation (1) replacing
a firm’s abnormal return by the average abnormal return of other stocks of firms in the same
industry following each insider purchase’s announcement. We use two levels of Thomson
Reuters Datastream’s industry classification that divide firms into either 43 or 113 distinct
industries. As shown in estimates reported on the first line of Table 3’s bottom panel, other
stocks in the same industry as stocks traded by Sarkozy associates do not exhibit larger
abnormal returns after than before the election on the days following the announcement
of stock purchases by Sarkozy associates. This suggests that the increase in suspicious ac-
tivity of connected Directors is not due to easier access to (privileged) government-sourced
information that would be relevant for all firms in the same industry.
Then we calculate abnormal returns at the date at which purchases are placed, rather
than announced, as the market should not react to trades that are not yet public knowledge.
We next use the abnormal returns following the announcement of sales, as Lakonishok and
Lee (2001) and Jeng et al. (2003) argue that insider sales contain little information as they are
generally made for diversification or liquidity purposes. We also calculate the time from each
trade to the firm’s next public event that is not a results announcement—and therefore is
an event that presumably generates less or no privileged information—and the time between
33The CAC40 is a capitalization-weighted measure of the 40 most significant stocks of the French stock
market.
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a trade and the firm’s last results announcement. All placebo dependent variables produce
difference-in-differences estimates that are not different from zero.
Additional robustness checks
Online Appendix G presents a series of additional robustness checks. We first show that the
main estimates cannot be replicated using a placebo election date: We shift the election back
and forth by up to five months in 2007 and re-estimate equation (1) around each of these
dates; then, we replicate the data construction, i.e., the definition of the 2-year observation
window and the selection of the associates’ firms sample, and we re-estimate equation (1)
replacing the actual election date of May 6th 2007 by all Sundays from May 2008 to May
2011. We then verify that our findings are robust to excluding influential observations or
the most active traders, to alternative construction of standard errors and p-values, and to
various specification changes.
4.3 Difference-in-differences estimates, trader fixed effects
The data structure allows us to estimate equation (1) using trader fixed effects. This ap-
proach, however, mechanically reduces the number of individuals and observations used to
identify our coefficient of interest, as not all traders trade before and after the election.
Excluding Directors who trade only before or only after the election reduces the sample of
trades by about one fourth, and the number of Sarkozy associates who survive this filter is
halved.
Table 4 reports estimates obtained using the same specifications as in Table 2 but using
trader fixed effects in addition to firm fixed effects. More precisely, columns 1, 3 and 5
of the top panel of Table 4 display estimates obtained when using trader fixed effects and
the minimum difference-in-differences explanatory variables of interest as well as trade’s
covariates. Firm fixed effects are introduced in columns 2, 4 and 6 of the top panel and
further interacted with the post-election dummy variables in columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table
4’s bottom panel. Finally, we included a linear trend for each group of traders and report
estimated coefficients in columns 2, 4 and 6 of the bottom panel. Overall, the evidence
based on the specifications with trader fixed effects is consistent with previous findings. In
particular, including group-specific linear trends does not substantially alter our estimates
of interest which remain very precise.
Online Appendix Figure A2 echoes Figure 2 by displaying sub-period interactions terms
estimated in the presence of trader fixed effects with (black-filled circles) and without (hollow
circles) firm fixed effects. We do not observe any difference in pre-election trends across
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groups for any of the three financial outcomes we study. The Sarkozy associates’ change in
behavior appears in the vicinity of the 2007 Presidential election.
Online Appendix Table A3 displays the same robustness checks as Table 3 but uses a
specification with trader and firm fixed effects as in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 4. Es-
timates of interest appear robust to changes in the construction of dependent variables.
Finally, regressions with placebo dependent variables return estimated coefficients that are
not statistically significant.
4.4 Pseudo-synthetic control estimates
This sub-section takes further advantage of the fact that some Directors trade both before
and after the election to implement the pseudo-synthetic control method described in sub-
section 3.4.
The top panel of Table 5 displays the estimates from this approach for the three dependent
variables. These estimates of the Sarkozy associates’ change in behavior following the 2007
Presidential election are consistent with the previous findings. They are about twice as
large when the dependent variable is abnormal returns or compliance with legal reporting
requirements. The estimate is roughly the same size as that in column 6 of Table 2’s top
panel for the time from a trade to the firm’s next results announcement.
Figures 3(a)–(c) depict the synthetic control estimates for each of the alternative depen-
dent variables over the eight 3-month sub-periods dividing the 2-year period around Sarkozy’s
election. The four pre-election sub-periods are those used to construct the synthetic control
group. Figures 3(a)–(c) also show, for each sub-period, the distribution of the estimates from
1, 000 placebo groups of associates. These placebo groups also help us evaluate the statistical
significance of the estimates by calculating the p-values from the resulting distributions. As
shown in the top panel of Online Appendix Table 5, the p-values are either below or close
to conventional statistical-significance levels. The same remark applies when we select only
placebo groups with a root square error over the pre-treatment sub-periods less than twice
that of the original group.
These synthetic control estimates mechanically assign considerable importance to Sarkozy
associates who trade more than others, who contribute more to both the selection of the
synthetic control group over the pre-election period and the calculation of the post-election
differences between Sarkozy associates and the Directors in the selected control group. We
modify our approach to address this issue as follows. First, using the same duplication
weights as previously, we construct a synthetic control group for each Sarkozy associate by
minimizing the difference between her pre-election outcome and that of other Directors. We
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then calculate the post-election difference between each Sarkozy associate and her control
group, and we average these differences across Sarkozy associates. This assigns the same
weight to each Sarkozy associate, but it comes at the cost of not being able to decompose
the estimates over time. The bottom panel of Online Appendix Table 5 presents the estimates
from this modified approach, together with the p-values from its application to 1, 000 placebo
groups of associates drawn from the sample of non-connected Directors. Online Appendix
Figures A3(a)–(c) present the results graphically. The estimates from this modified approach
are consistent with those described above.
Online Appendix Table A4 and Figures A4(a)–(c) and A5(a)–(c) further display the
synthetic control estimates obtained when we use only non-connected Directors who sit on
the same Boards as Sarkozy associates do to construct the donor pool. These estimates are
similar to those obtained when all Directors are included in the donor pool.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate whether political connections affect the individual propensity
to engage in illegal activities in financial markets. We analyze detailed data on all reported
transactions made by insiders on their company stocks over the 2006–2008 period and doc-
ument a clear change in the financial behavior of Directors who are connected to Nicolas
Sarkozy after he won the 2007 French Presidential election: Connected Directors use pri-
vate information more when trading, relative to non-connected Directors. Our analyses also
reveal that they are less likely to comply with legal trade-reporting requirements, and they
trade closer to their firms’ results announcements. Overall, trades by Sarkozy associates
exhibit more suspicious trading patterns after his election.
Our difference-in-differences analysis compares Sarkozy associates to non-connected Di-
rectors who sit on the same Boards. Our estimates of interest thus represent a lower bound
of the true effect of political connections on trading behavior if this effect spills over to
non-connected Board Members. One simple way of testing for within-firm spillovers is to
run our main regression on the full sample of trading French Directors and add a dummy
variable interacted with the post-election variable to see whether non-connected Directors
in associates’ firms also changed their behavior. These estimates appear in the top panel
of Appendix Table A5. They are not statistically significant, so non-connected Directors
do not seem to change their behavior after the 2007 Presidential election, which argues
against within-firm spillovers. On the contrary, the triple difference-in-differences estimates
of the Sarkozy associates’ change in behavior is consistent with the difference-in-differences
estimates above.
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Sarkozy associates are composed of friends of the President and large contributors to
his campaign. There is no a priori reason for these groups to react differently to Sarkozy’s
election, but we should not assume that they will react identically, either. We separate
the two groups by interacting two distinct dummy variables with the post-election variable.
The estimates appear in the middle panel of Appendix Table A5. We find no evidence
that either group consistently (i.e., across the three dependent variables) engaged in more
suspicious activities. However, the similarity in the estimates might reflect the small sample
sizes in the sub-groups.
The changed behavior of Sarkozy associates that we uncover naturally raises the question
of the benefits gained. Although we do not know the entire change in Directors’ portfolios,
as insider trades have had to be reported to the AMF only since mid-2006, and trades
on shares of firms for which Directors do not qualify as insiders are not reported, a back-
of-the-envelope calculation can help estimate the profitability of this change in behavior.
We thus calculate the latent returns as the gap between the change in the stock price and
the market index over the 30-day period following a purchase. We then take this as the
dependent variable in the above difference-in-differences setting. This resulting estimate
suggests that the Sarkozy associates’ latent returns rose by 3.17% after the election, relative
to those of non-connected Directors. Multiplying this figure by the total value of stock
purchases by Sarkozy associates in the year following the election produces a total excess
latent benefit of 43.4 millionAC, corresponding to 886, 000AC per Sarkozy associate following
the 2007 Presidential election. This is a significant amount in the French context, where the
average CEO fixed salary in the 40 largest French listed firms was 985, 000AC in 2007 (Teulon
2013). Including bonuses and stock options, the average CAC40 CEO total compensation
was 4.6 millionAC in 2007, and 886, 000AC represents 19% of this amount. However, CAC40
CEOs are the top Executives in terms of total compensation in France, and our sample
of associates also includes Directors who probably earn less (in smaller firms and/or other
positions), for whom 886, 000AC represents an even larger relative gain. As a final comparison,
an investment of 17.7 millionAC over a year in a market with a 5% annual return would earn
the same amount. In conclusion, while the above calculation is not exact, it does indicate
that the individual benefits from Sarkozy associates’ change in behavior are likely to be
substantial and compare favorably to their business remuneration.
Given our evidence that Sarkozy’s election was associated with a change in behavior by
his associates towards more-suspicious trading, we might expect the opposite effect after
he left office following his defeat to François Hollande in the 2012 Presidential election.
We re-estimate our baseline specification over the two-year period around May 5th 2012
as a test. The difference-in-differences estimates for the three dependent variables appear
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at the bottom of Online Appendix Table A5. These estimates turn out to be statistically
insignificant and provide no evidence of a change towards less-suspicious behavior, although
there is a slight rise in compliance with trade-reporting requirements (p-value= 0.164). This
suggests that the effect of connections to Sarkozy found in the main text had disappeared by
2012. This could reflect the number of scandals over the 2009–2012 period in which Sarkozy
was directly or indirectly implicated (Laffargue 2018). These may have reduced the value of
connections to the President. In addition, the prosecution of illegal insider trading in France
changed significantly after 2008, with the implementation of more-restrictive legislation on
insider trading, as recommended by the European Union.34 This may well have gradually
reduced the latitude of French Directors to engage in opportunistic trading.
We last consider the external validity of our paper’s findings. Two characteristics of the
French context make our main result—that political connections favor opportunistic trades
by insiders—arguably generalizable to other developed countries: The French regulation of
insider trading has much in common with that of other developed countries, and the French
media have long scrutinized the ramifications of Sarkozy’s social network inside the business
community. It may well be that the effect of political connections on insider trading is even
larger in contexts when there is less visibility or media attention.
34For instance, the maximum penalty for trading using privileged information was increased to
100 millionAC and twenty years imprisonment in 2010. In 2010, the AMF made its first recommendations
about no-trade windows applying to insiders in listed firms.
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Dély, Renaud, and Didier Hassoux. Sarkozy et l’Argent Roi. Calmann-Levy, Paris, 2008.
Deming, David. “Better Schools, Less Crime?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126: (2011)
2063–2115.
Di Tella, Rafael, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. “Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using
the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack.” American Economic Review 94:
(2004) 115–133.
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Figure 1: Distributions of Sarkozy associates’ characteristics vis-à-vis other Directors.
(a) Size of firms. (b) Executive positions.
(c) Number of trades over two years. (d) Trade values.
Sarkozy associates are Directors connected to Nicolas Sarkozy. See the text for details about the construction of the group.
Associates’ firms are those whose Board includes at least one Sarkozy associate. Figure (a) plots the distributions of firm
market capitalization in 2007 depending on whether Sarkozy associates sit on the firm’s Board. For each of the three categories
of Directors, the Figure (b) plots the percentage of Directors who hold no, 1, 2 and 3 or more Executive positions. For each of
the three categories of Directors, the Figures (c) and (d) plot the distributions of Directors according to the total number of
trades carried out over two years and the average value of these trades, respectively.
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Figure 2: The dynamics of Sarkozy associates’ change in behavior around Sarkozy’s election:
Non-parametric differences and sub-period interaction terms.
(a) Two-day compound abnormal return on pur-
chases.
(b) Compliance with the five-day disclosure require-
ment.
(c) Time from trade to the firm’s next result an-
nouncement.
The hollow circles depict, for each of the eight three-month sub-periods around Sarkozy’s election, the difference between
Sarkozy associates’ average outcome and those of non-connected Directors who sit on the same Board as at least one connected
Director. The black dots represent estimates of the Sarkozy associate variable interacted with the variables dividing up the
two-year period around Sarkozy’s election into eight three-month sub-periods. The reference period is May to July 2006. As in
the even-numbered columns in Table 2, the regressions include covariates and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by trader, firm and date. See the notes to Table 2 for the definition of the dependent variables. The lower-bounds of some
confidence intervals are truncated for representation reasons.
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Figure 3: Pseudo-synthetic control estimates of the change in behavior of Sarkozy associates
around Sarkozy’s election.
(a) Two-day compound abnormal return on pur-
chases.
(b) Compliance with the five-day disclosure require-
ment.
(c) Time from trade to the firm’s next result an-
nouncement.
The figures present the pseudo-synthetic control estimates for each of the eight three-month sub-periods around Sarkozy’s
election. The four pre-election sub-periods are used to construct the synthetic control group. See the text for more details on
the method. The distributions of placebo-group estimates come from 1, 000 placebo groups of associates drawn randomly from
the set of non-connected Directors, allowing for up to 25% differences in the size of the group with respect to the original group
of Sarkozy associates.
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Table 1: Difference-in-differences estimation of changes in the trading patterns of Sarkozy associates
around Sarkozy’s election.
Dependent variable Trade, extensive margin Number of trades Log of number of trades
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Full Associates’ firms Full Associates’ firms Full Associates’ firms
Post-election 0.040** -0.018 0.201 0.510 0.018 0.109
(0.016) (0.038) (0.333) (0.650) (0.039) (0.081)
Sarkozy associate 0.158** 0.130* 12.162* 12.707* 0.570** 0.556**
(0.063) (0.067) (7.170) (7.199) (0.226) (0.232)
Sarkozy associate -0.040 0.018 4.853 4.544 0.335 0.245
× Post-election (0.088) (0.095) (11.704) (11.756) (0.319) (0.328)
Dependent variable Sales ratio Total traded amount (log) Average traded amount (log)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample Full Associates’ firms Full Associates’ firms Full Associates’ firms
Post-election -0.096*** -0.125*** -0.083 -0.384 -0.102 -0.493**
(0.018) (0.038) (0.108) (0.252) (0.099) (0.218)
Sarkozy associate -0.050 -0.061 2.673*** 1.409** 2.103*** 0.853*
(0.063) (0.067) (0.528) (0.547) (0.444) (0.461)
Sarkozy associate -0.070 -0.040 -0.192 0.109 -0.528 -0.137
× Post-election (0.083) (0.090) (0.739) (0.775) (0.615) (0.647)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White-heteroskedastic standard errors appear in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each column presents
estimates from a separate regression. All regressions include a constant term. The observations are Board Members of French listed firms
who traded stocks of their firm within 365 days of the French Presidential election of May 6th 2007. Sarkozy associate is a dummy for
the trader being connected to Nicolas Sarkozy. See the text for details of the construction of this group. The full sample contains all
Directors. The associates’ firms sample includes connected Directors and non-connected Directors who sit on the same Board as at least
one connected Director. An observation is a Director’s trading behavior observed either before or after the election. Post-election is a
dummy for all trades that occurred after the election. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a dummy for the Director trading
during the period, for each of the pre- or post-election periods. Each Director is thus observed twice. The sample sizes are 3, 654 and 770
in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Columns 3–12 restrict the sample to Directors who trade during the pre- or post-periods. The sample
sizes are 2, 268 and 488 in the even- and odd-numbered columns, respectively.
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Table 2: Difference-in-differences estimation of changes in behavior of Sarkozy associates around
Sarkozy’s election.
Panel A
Two-day compound abnormal Compliance with the five-day Time from trade to the firm’s
Dependent variable return on purchases disclosure requirement next result announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-election -0.004* -0.008 0.039 -0.302** 6.791 35.734*
(0.002) (0.009) (0.046) (0.149) (16.676) (21.049)
Sarkozy associate -0.006** -0.004 -0.038 0.084* 7.636 32.581***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.133) (0.047) (11.814) (11.951)
Sarkozy associate × Post-election 0.006** 0.009** -0.206* -0.126** -24.179 -46.412***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.112) (0.054) (16.916) (17.150)
Observations 1,301 2,851 2,455
Covariates and firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Panel B
Two-day compound abnormal Compliance with the five-day Time from trade to the firm’s
Dependent variable return on purchases disclosure requirement next result announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-election -0.005 -0.225 71.922**
(0.012) (0.143) (31.440)
Sarkozy associate -0.003*** -0.009 0.081*** 0.287 24.701*** 50.190**
(0.001) (0.007) (0.015) (0.206) (3.403) (23.861)
Sarkozy associate × Post-election 0.009*** 0.009 -0.063*** -0.326 -20.638 -69.306**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.022) (0.233) (13.076) (34.389)
Observations 1,301 2,851 2,455
Covariates and firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects × Post-election Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by trader, firm and date appear in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each column
presents estimates from a separate regression. All regressions include a constant term. Observations are trades by Board Members of
French listed firms that took place within 365 days of the French Presidential election of May 6th 2007. Post-election is a dummy for
all trades occurring after the election. Sarkozy associate is a dummy for the trader being connected to Nicolas Sarkozy. See the text
for details of the construction of this group. The sample includes connected Directors and non-connected Directors who sit on the same
Board as at least one connected Director. Covariates include a dummy for individuals who are members of the Management Board of
the firm at the date of the trade, the (log of the) trade value, and interaction terms between these two variables and the post-election
dummy. See Table A1 in the Online Appendix for the estimated coefficients on these variables. Two-day compound abnormal return on
purchases is the compound abnormal return (calculated using a firm-specific 30-day market model) of the traded stock over the two days
following the announcement of a purchase. Compliance with the five-day disclosure requirement is a dummy for the trade being disclosed
within five business days. Time from trade to the firm’s next result announcement is the time (in days) between the trade’s date and
the next public announcement of results by the firm. In the top panel, estimates from simple regression with the minimum regressors
for the difference-in-differences specifications are included in the odd-numbered columns. Estimates of specification (1) are reported in
even-numbered columns. The bottom panel reports estimates from regressions that differ from specification (1) in that they include firm
fixed effects interacted with the post-election dummy (odd-numbered columns) or a linear trend and a linear trend interacted with the
Sarkozy associate variable (even-numbered columns).
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Table 3: Difference-in-differences estimation of the change in behavior of Sarkozy associates around
Sarkozy’s election: Alternative and placebo dependent variables.
Alternative dependent variables
7-day market model 0.014*** 14-day market model 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005)
60-day market model 0.008** 120-day market model 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
240-day market model 0.007** CAC 40 market model 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004)
1-day abnormal return 0.004 3-day compound abnormal return 0.011**
(0.002) (0.004)
4-day compound abnormal return 0.008* 5-day compound abnormal return 0.010*
(0.005) (0.005)
Number of business days until 3.265** Log of number of business days 0.275**
disclosure (1.341) until disclosure (0.107)
Log of time from trade to firm’s -0.418** Less than 2 months to firm’s 0.174*
announcement (0.207) announcement (0.089)
Placebo dependent variables
2-day compound abnormal return 0.000 2-day compound abnormal return -0.000
of same-industry firms (43 industries) (0.002) of same-industry firms (113 industries) (0.002)
2-day compound abnormal return 0.004 2-day compound abnormal return 0.002
at transaction date (0.004) following sales (0.003)
Time from trade to firm’s next event, -3.746 Times from trade to firm’s -4.427
excluding results announcements (10.293) last results announcement (14.520)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by trader, firm and date appear in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each cell
presents an estimate from a separate regression. The reported estimate is for Sarkozy associate × Post-election. All regressions include
a constant term, post-election, Sarkozy associate, covariates and firm fixed effects, as in Table 2. The observations are trades by Board
Members of French listed firms that took place within 365 days of the French Presidential election of May 6th 2007. Post-election is a
dummy for all trades that occurred after the election. Sarkozy associate is a dummy for the trader being connected to Sarkozy. See the
text for details of the construction of this group. The sample is restricted to connected Directors and non-connected Directors who sit
on the same Board as at least one connected Director. The regressions differ from those in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 2 in the change
of the dependent variable as indicated. See the text for more details. 2-day compound abnormal return of same-industry firms is the
average of the 2-day compound abnormal returns of firms of the same industry following the announcement of a stock’s purchase by an
insider, dividing firms into 43 and 113 categories following Thomson Reuters Datastream’s industry level 4 and 6 classifications.
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Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimation of changes in behavior of Sarkozy associates around
Sarkozy’s election: Trader fixed effects.
Panel A
Two-day compound abnormal Compliance with the five-day Time from trade to the firm’s
Dependent variable return on purchases disclosure requirement next result announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-election -0.004 0.001 -0.213* -0.225* 65.428*** 71.272***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.117) (0.129) (21.668) (22.225)
Sarkozy associate × Post-election 0.010** 0.011* -0.148*** -0.160*** -66.978*** -69.641***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.055) (0.061) (22.172) (24.025)
Observations 946 2,170 1,836
Covariates and trader fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Panel B
Two-day compound abnormal Compliance with the five-day Time from trade to the firm’s
Dependent variable return on purchases disclosure requirement next result announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-election 0.003 -0.209* 75.073***
(0.011) (0.124) (22.139)
Sarkozy associate × Post-election 0.012* 0.011** -0.152*** -0.152** -31.685** -68.561***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.056) (0.062) (15.214) (23.789)
Observations 946 2,170 1,836
Covariates and trader fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects × Post-election Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by trader, firm and date appear in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each
column presents estimates from a separate regression. Observations are trades by Board Members of French listed firms that took place
within 365 days of the French Presidential election of May 6th 2007. Post-election is a dummy for all trades occurring after the election.
Sarkozy associate is a dummy for the trader being connected to Nicolas Sarkozy. See the text for details of the construction of this group.
The sample includes connected Directors and non-connected Directors who sit on the same Board as at least one connected Director
and for whom the dependent variable is observed at least once before and after the election. All regressions include a constant term and
trader fixed effects. Covariates include a dummy for individuals who are members of the Management Board of the firm at the date
of the trade, the (log of the) trade value, and interaction terms between these two variables and the post-election dummy. See Table
A2 in the Online Appendix for the estimated coefficients on these variables. Two-day compound abnormal return on purchases is the
compound abnormal return (calculated using a firm-specific 30-day market model) of the traded stock over the two days following the
announcement of a purchase. Compliance with the five-day disclosure requirement is a dummy for the trade being disclosed within five
business days. Time from trade to the firm’s next result announcement is the time (in days) between the trade’s date and the next public
announcement of results by the firm. In the top panel, estimations reported in even-numbered columns include firm fixed effects. The
bottom panel reports estimates from regressions that include firm fixed effects interacted with the post-election dummy (odd-numbered
columns) or a linear trend and a linear trend interacted with the Sarkozy associate variable (even-numbered columns).
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Table 5: Pseudo-synthetic control estimation of the change in behavior of Sarkozy associates around
Sarkozy’s election.
Group-level pseudo-synthetic control group
Two-day compound Compliance with the Time from trade
abnormal return the five-day disclosure to the firm’s next
on purchases requirement result announcement
0.018 -0.246 -54.763
P-value, all placebo groups [0.045]** [0.020]** [0.121]
P-value, selected placebo groups [0.007]*** [0.021]** [0.067]*
Individual-level pseudo-synthetic control group
Two-day compound Compliance with the Time from trade
abnormal return the five-day disclosure to the firm’s next
on purchases requirement result announcement
0.011 -0.258 -33.042
P-value, all placebo groups [0.128] [0.019]** [0.118]
P-value, selected placebo groups [0.067]* [0.006]*** [0.056]*
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-values in brackets. The top panel shows the pseudo-synthetic control estimates from the approach
presented in the text. The bottom panel displays the pseudo-synthetic control estimates obtained by finding a control group for each
Sarkozy associate by minimizing the difference between the pre-election outcome of this Director and that of other Directors; calculating
the post-election difference between each Sarkozy associate and her control group; and averaging the post-election estimates across Sarkozy
associates. The p-values are calculated using the distribution of estimates obtained from replicating the pseudo-synthetic control approach
for 1, 000 placebo groups of associates drawn randomly from the set of non-connected Directors, allowing for up to 25% differences in
the size of the group with respect to the original group of Sarkozy associates. The p-values using selected placebo group only use placebo
groups with a root square error over the pre-treatment sub-periods, or a root square average pre-election difference, less than twice that
in the original group, for the top and the bottom panel, respectively.
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